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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the chattel mortgagee would seem to have become a creditor prior to
the time that the vendee acquired possession. 7 This removes the case
from the reason of the statute and suggests the desirability of a re-
sult contrary to that reached.8 Three analogous types of cases, in
which the statute has been held inapplicable, point to the same con-
clusion: first, cases in which a mortgagee is in possession;9 second,
cases in which a judgment creditor obtains a judgment before the
execution of a conditional sale contract and the transfer of possession
of property thereunder ;1O and third, cases in which there was a mort-
gage on after acquired property. In the last situation liens already
on the property when it came into the hands of the mortgagor were
held not to be displaced."1
The provision of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, protecting
purchasers from 'or creditors of the buyer, is drafted to protect both
prior and subsequent creditors who have acquired a lien on the goods
by levy or attachment and would take care of several of the problems
raised in the instant case.'
2
NAOMI ALEXANDER.
Criminal Procedure-Use of Suspended Sentence to
Secure Civil Redress.
In a criminal prosecution' for assault with a deadly weapon the
defendant was convicted, fined $250, and sentenced to two years im-
prisonment. Capias was not to issue, however, if payment of $2500
was made to prosecutrix in $50 monthly installments, the same to be
I North Carolina recording statute protects lien creditors only and not gen-
eral creditors. See Francis v. Herren, supra note 6, at 507, 8 S. E. at 358; Na-
tional Bank of Goldsboro v. Hill, 226 Fed. 102, 115 (E. D. N. C. 1915).
'ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §6898 (recording statute protects "judgment
creditors" generally) ; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3318 (recording statute
protects "third parties") ; both of these statutes have been construed to protect
a subsequent and not a prior creditor, in the following respective cases: Elliott
v. Palmer, 9 Ala, App. 483, 64 So. 182 (1913) ; Conder v. Holleman, 71 Ga.
93 (1883).
'Cowan v. Whitener, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925) ; JONEs, op. cit.
supra note 3, §§178, 236; Note (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 110, 115.
"0Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1137; Second National Bank v. Ohio Contract
Purchase Co., 28 Ohio App. 93, 162 N. E. 460 (1927).
U Standard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564 (1916).
' UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §5: "Every provision in a conditional
sale reserving property in the seller, shall be void as to any purchaser from or
creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such pr6vision, purchases the
goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract
or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such contract or
copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the conditional sale."
' State v. Barnhardt, June term, 1927, Forsyth Superior Court.
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secured by sufficient bond. The prosecutrix agreed, in consideration
of the undertaking, to take a nonsuit in the civil action then pending
against the defendant. The latter defaulted after payment of $1350,
and plaintiff brought action on bond to collect remainder. From a
judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appealed and was awarded a new trial.2
Suspended judgments are now accepted in both theory and prac-
tice by North Carolina courts.3 Conditions of suspension vary widely
in nature and number.4 In the principal case, payment of costs and
fine, filing of bond to indemnify the injured party, and the non-opera-
tion of an automobile for two years were conditions imposed.2 The
breach or non-performance of one of the several conditions of a sus-
pended sentence is sufficient to invoke enforcement of the entire
judgment. 6 Full performance by the defendant was seemingly re-
quired in the instant case. If it may be considered that the settlement
of the pending civil action became a condition of suspension, it would
appear that the case illustrates a material extension in the scope of the
'Myers v. Barnhardt, 202 N. C. 49, 161 S. E. 715 (1932).
' Chief Justice Stacy, writing the opinion in the instant case, says that "the
practice of suspending judgments in criminal prosecutions, upon terms that are
reasonable and just, or staying executions therein for a time, with the consent
of the defendant, has so long prevailed in our courts of general jurisdiction
that it may now be considered established -by both custom and judicial decision,
as a part of the permissible procedure in such cases." This language is sup-
ported by State v. Edwards, 192 N. C. 321, 135 S. E. 37 (1926) ; State v. Everitt,
164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848 (1913).
" Sentences have been suspended in North Carolina upon these conditions:
good behavior, State v. Everitt, supra note 3 ; that the defendant leave the state,
State v. McAfee, 198 N. C. 507, 152 S. E. 391 (1930) ; that he leave the county
permanently, Ex parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 310, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.)
352 (1911) ; that he pay the costs, State v. Griffis, 117 N. C. 709, 23 S. E. 164
(1895) ; that he keep the peace and not libel certain persons, State v. Sanders,
153 N. C. 624, 69 S. E. 272 (1910) ; that he observe the prohibition laws and
show good behavior, State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150, 83 S. E. 630 (1914). Com-
ments upon North Carolina cases are to be found in (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv.
116; (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 327; (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 465. Valuable notes
on the topic in its wider application are found in (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 543;
(1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 369.
'Counsel for the defense raised the objection on appeal that the judgment
rendered in the trial court was void for alternativeness, but the court rejected
the plea. But few criminal judgments have been declared void for this reason
in North Carolina. The writer has been able to discover but three such cases:
State v. Bennett, 20 N. C. 170 (1838) ; State v. Perkins, 82 N. C. 682 (1880);
It re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244 (1890).
'In State v. Strange, 183 N. C. 775, 111 S. E. 350 (1922), judgment was
suspended on payment of costs and continued good behavior for two years. The
costs were paid and the defendant released. But on proof of subsequent viola-
tion of the liquor laws his sentence was put into effect. In State v. Hardin, 183
N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922), the terms of the suspension were payment of
costs, payment of private prosecutor's fees, and good behavior. An attempt
was made to enforce the sentence because of alleged breach of the last-named
conditions, but on appeal the case was reversed because of insufficient evidence
on this one point.
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suspended judgment as most commonly employed in North Carolina.7
Where a criminal action follows the civil action, clearly no en-
forceable settlement based on a promise to forego criminal prosecu-
tion may be reached since it would run counter to the inhibition of
stifling criminal prosecutions.8 But this so-called "public policy"
objection does not apply to stifling purely civil actions, i.e. to their
settlement out of court. This raises the question of the advisability
of "double adjudication," or the settlement of civil disputes in con-
nection with criminal prosecutions.9 Our past judicial theory and
practice have been in favor of separate settlements. Most decidedly
have the courts been opposed to the substitution of one for the
other.10 The practice, nevertheless, seems to have seeped into the
judicial structure, notably in "bad check" cases appearing in justice
of the peace courts. It is submitted that the merger of civil into
criminal actions in proper circumstances is a practice worthy of com-
mendation for the reasons that: (1) litigation is minimized; (2) an
injured party has a better chance of restitution when the wrong-doer
is financially irresponsible;11 (3) criminal prosecution is not stifled.
WILSON BARBER.
'A slight variation from this type of case is to be found in State v. Schlich-
ter, 194 N. C. 277, 139 S. E. 448 (1927), in which the judgment rendered was
held to be neither an alternative nor a suspended judgment, but a suspended
execution. The defendants, officers of a defunct bank, had been convicted and
sentenced for violation of the state banking laws. Capias was to issue at the
next term of court in the event that the presiding judge found as a matter of
fact that the defendants had failed to make proper restitution to the receiver.
The analogy with the principal case is clear: in each instance the defendants
could avoid imprisonment by making restitution to the injured individuals.
" Corbett v. Clute, 137 N. C. 546, 50 S. E. 216 (1905), was an action to fore-
close a mortgage, the sole consideration and inducement of which was that the
plaintiff would refrain from prosecuting the defendant's son for obtaining
goods and money under false pretenses. The court quoted with approval from
Garner v. Qualls, 49 N. C. 223, 224 (1856). "It is manifest that contracts
founded upon agreements to compound felonies or to stifle public prosecution
of any kind" cannot be enforced in a court of justice. Strong language was
employed by the court, speaking through Chief Justice Smith, in Commissioners
of Guilford County v. March, 89 N. C. 268, 271 (1883) : "The principle is too
well settled to require more than its mere enunciation, that any instrument
taken which tends to obstruct the firm and impartial administration of public
justice, will not be recognized and enforced."
' It is obvious that the two actions-civil and criminal-would have to arise
from the same transaction.
"0To agree to refrain from a threatened criminal prosecution in considera-
tion of a private settlement would be in notorious violation of the principles so
zealously protected in the cases cited supra note 8, and also laid down in John-
son v. Pittman, 194 N. C. 298, 139 S. E. 440 (1927).
' The brief for the defendant affirms a suspicion raised by the report of
the case to the effect that although the plaintiff could have secured a judgment
against the defendant in the civil action begun, but subsequently abandoned, it
would have been in fact worthless because of the defendant's financial status.
Unless the type of settlement here secured be more widely adopted, many a
hapless victim of one's wrong-doing will go unrecompensed because the de-
fendant is without estate.
